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INTRODUCTION 
The story of marriage equality under state constitutions is quite mixed. The 
story begins when the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin indicated that 
strict scrutiny should be used for the prohibition of same-sex marriage on the 
ground it was gender discrimination.1 The court explained that it was solely a 
person’s sex that kept him or her from marrying someone of the same sex.2 The 
Hawaii Court remanded the case to the lower court for the application of strict 
scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution’s use of this test for gender 
discrimination. Before this could occur, though, Hawaii voters amended their 
constitution to prevent marriage equality.3 
The Vermont Supreme Court found a right to same-sex civil unions, but 
not marriage for gay and lesbian couples.4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in a historic ruling interpreted its state constitution to create a 
 
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of 
Law. 
1. 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993). 
2. Id. at 60. 
3. Article I, section 23 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: “The legislature shall have 
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. This was 
adopted by an initiative passed by sixty-nine percent of the citizens of Hawaii on November 
3, 1998. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, 
Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000). 
4. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
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constitutional right to marriage equality.5 It rejected that civil unions could 
substitute for the right of gays and lesbians to marry. The New York Court of 
Appeals, though, rejected marriage equality under its constitution in a four-to-
two decision.6  
The California Supreme Court, by a four-three margin, invalidated that 
state’s ban on same sex marriage only to have its decision overruled about six 
months later by an initiative, Proposition 8, to amend the state constitution.7 
The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously found that the prohibition of same sex 
marriage violated the Iowa Constitution.8  
Meanwhile, over the course of the decade, voters in many states amended 
their state constitutions to declare that marriage had to be between a man and a 
woman and thus foreclose any chance of their state courts finding a right to 
marriage equality.9 This limits the number of additional states where state 
supreme courts can interpret their state constitutions to create a right to 
marriage equality. 
The conclusion which I draw from this quick review of history is that state 
constitutional law is a necessary, but inadequate second best to advancing 
individual liberties when that cannot be accomplished under the United States 
Constitution. Ever since the Supreme Court turned sharply to the right with the 
appointment of four justices by Richard Nixon early in his presidency, liberals 
have thought of state constitutional law as an alternative. Supreme Court 
Justice William Brennan in a famous article in the Harvard Law Review in 
1977 urged this.10 Brennan called upon state courts to “step into the breach” 
left by the U.S. Supreme Court’s retreat from its commitment to the protection 
of individual rights in the wake of the Nixon appointments to the Court.11 A 
wave of scholarship exalting state constitutional law developed. The late 
Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court observed that turning to 
 
5. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
6. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006). 
7. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). In Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 
48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009), the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8. 
8. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
9. See Jesse McKinley & Laura Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1 (reporting that voters in Arizona, California, and Florida passed 
initiatives to ban same-sex marriage); see also John L.S. Simpkins, Structuring State 
Constitutional Review: Comparative Perspectives, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 535, 541 n.18 
(2009) (“In 2004, for example, voters approved measures banning same-sex marriage in 
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Ohio, Oregon, and Utah.”); Dan Savage, Op-Ed., Anti-Gay, Anti-Family, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2008, at A31 (reporting that Arkansas voters passed a state initiative to ban gay men and 
lesbians from adopting children).  
10. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977). 
11. Id. at 503; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The 
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 535 
(1986). 
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state constitutions offered something for both liberals and conservatives: it is a 
way for liberals to have a continuation of the Warren Court’s expansion of 
constitutional rights, while at the same time providing conservatives “the 
triumph of federalism.”12 
Of course, it is not just in the area of marriage equality that lawyers have 
turned to state courts and state constitutions to try and accomplish what could 
not be done under the United States Constitution. For example, after the 
Supreme Court in 1973 (with all four Nixon appointees in the majority) held in 
San Antonio Board of Education v. Rodriguez that inequalities in school 
funding do not violate the Constitution,13 a number of states found such 
disparities to violate their state constitutions.14 Another illustration of this is 
state courts recognizing a right under state constitutions to use private shopping 
centers for speech purposes, although the Supreme Court has rejected such a 
right under the United States Constitution.15 
Yet, as someone who cares about civil liberties and civil rights, as a lawyer 
as well as an academic, I am left with a somewhat ambivalent feeling about 
state constitutional law. In every area where I would like to see state 
constitutional rights develop, I would much prefer to see it accomplished under 
the United States Constitution if possible. If it cannot be done that way, then I 
am happy to see it done via state constitutions. Even then, I am aware of the 
tremendous limits on state constitutional law as a way of advancing individual 
liberties and civil rights. 
My point in this Essay is thus straightforward: the ability to protect 
individual rights through state constitutions is inherently limited. If the goal 
cannot be accomplished via the United States Constitution, then state 
constitutional law is a great back-up plan. But discussions of state 
constitutional law must include this reality; state constitutional law is a second 
best way to advance individual liberties and civil rights.  
I divide this Essay into two parts. In Part I, I describe the inherent limits of 
state constitutions as a way to protect individual liberties and civil rights. In 
Part II, I apply this to explain why I believe that Ted Olsen and David Boies 
made the right choice to bring a challenge to California’s Proposition 8 in 
 
12. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1081, 1081 (1985). 
13. 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973). 
14. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1977); Rose v. Council for 
Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 
555 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. 
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 
777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). 
15. Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (finding no First 
Amendment right to use privately owned shopping centers for speech purposes), with 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (upholding decision of 
California Supreme Court to recognize a state constitutional right to use privately owned 
shopping centers for speech purposes). 
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federal court as violating the United States Constitution. 
To be clear, nothing in this essay is at all critical of lawyers who turn to 
state courts or to state court judges to develop rights under state constitutions. I 
was thrilled by the decisions of the Massachusetts, California, and Iowa 
Supreme Courts recognizing state constitutional rights to marriage equality. 
Sometimes the development of rights under state constitutions is an important 
step to ultimately achieving national protection. I hope that is true with regard 
to marriage equality. But I write this Essay to urge caution in generalizing too 
much from a few pathbreaking decisions about the role of state constitutional 
law in advancing freedom and equality. 
I. THE LIMITS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Some of the limits of state constitutional law are obvious, others less so. 
But it is important to keep them in mind in any discussion of the potential for 
using state constitutionalism as a way of achieving social change. 
First, it must be remembered that states are limited by Supreme Court 
decisions which impose constitutional limits on government actions. To take an 
older example, during the first third of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
protect freedom of contract and struck down state laws that protected 
employees and consumers, such as minimum wage and maximum hours laws.16 
During this so-called Lochner era, the Court declared almost 200 laws 
unconstitutional.17 There is nothing that state courts and state constitutionalism 
could have done about this. Even a right to set a minimum wage under a state 
constitution would have been struck down. 
A more recent example would be constitutional limits the Supreme Court 
has imposed on race-conscious remedies. In Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court held that school districts may 
not use race as a factor in assigning students to schools to achieve 
desegregation unless they meet strict scrutiny.18 There is nothing any state in 
its constitution can do to get around this requirement which limits the ability to 
desegregate public schools. 
In January 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporations have the First 
Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of money in election 
campaigns.19 There is nothing that can be done to change this via state 
constitutions because obviously they cannot limit what the Supreme Court 
 
16. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invalidating a state law limiting the 
houses that bakers could work in a week), is regarded as the paradigm case of this era. 
17. BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942). 
18. 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007) (invalidating school desegregation plans in Louisville, 
Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington). 
19. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). 
CHEMERINSKY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2010 10:26 PM 
June 2010] TWO CHEERS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1699 
deems to be a First Amendment right. 
The point is an important one: state constitutionalism has the ability to 
protect rights where the Court says that none exist, but no ability to overcome 
decisions that restrict what governments can do. 
Second, relying on state constitutions never will provide more than partial 
success in advancing liberties and equality because the chance of succeeding in 
all states, or even most states, is small. This point is illustrated powerfully by a 
single example: at most, how many state supreme courts across the country are 
likely to recognize a constitutional right to marriage equality? Even if there had 
been no amendments to state constitutions precluding this, it is difficult to 
imagine it being more than a relative handful of states. When even the New 
York Court of Appeals refused to recognize such a right,20 would it be realistic 
to imagine the South Carolina Supreme Court or the Mississippi Supreme 
Court or the Oklahoma Supreme Court doing so? 
There are structural reasons to believe that significant advancement of 
individual liberties is unlikely to occur in most states. In thirty-eight states, 
state court judges face some form of electoral accountability.21 In some states, 
state supreme court justices run in partisan elections. In other states, justices 
face retention elections. The last two decades have seen a number of state 
supreme court justices losing their seats because of particular rulings, such as 
Rose Bird, Joseph Grodin, and Cruz Reynoso in California, Penny White in 
Tennessee, and David Lanphier in Nebraska.22 Professor Devins, in an Article 
in this issue, points out that none of the seven states that have recognized some 
form of marriage equality make use of contested judicial elections.23 Certainly 
this suggests that states with such systems are very unlikely to recognize such 
controversial new rights. 
Unquestionably, many issues of state constitutional law, even those 
advancing rights, are unlikely to make much difference in elections. And some 
justices on state supreme courts will be courageous and pay no attention to their 
coming electoral review. But controversial rulings, whether equalizing 
educational opportunity, limiting the death penalty, or providing marriage 
equality, will provide a target for attack in the next electoral review. The late 
California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said that for the judge facing the 
voters, electoral review is like having a crocodile in one’s bathtub; it is never 
possible to forget that it is there.24 It would thus be naïve to assume that elected 
 
20. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006). 
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 36 (5th ed. 2007). 
22. Rachel Paine Caufield, Reconciling the Judicial Ideal and the Democratic Impulse 
in Judicial Retention Elections, 74 MO. L. REV. 573, 587 (2009) (describing defeat of 
incumbent justices). 
23. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: 
Towards a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 
1675-79 (2010). 
24. Dan Morain, Kaus to Retire from State Supreme Court: Deplores Strident Attacks 
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judges and those facing retention elections will be as likely as federal judges 
with life tenure to take controversial steps to advance liberty and equality.  
Indeed, there are some areas where state constitutionalism just would never 
happen. The easiest example here is the desegregation of the south. If the 
Supreme Court had not decided Brown v. Board of Education,25 it is 
unthinkable that many state courts in the south would have found that state 
mandated segregation of schools violated state constitutions. The 
implementation of Brown occurred entirely in the federal courts as a result of 
courageous federal judges.26 
Also, it is important to recognize that many states do not have a tradition of 
using their state constitutions to provide rights greater than that in the United 
States Constitution. Professor James Gardner, in one of the relatively few 
articles criticizing state constitutionalism, conducted a careful review of the 
decisions of a number of state supreme courts. He concluded: “Just as striking 
as the infrequency of state constitutional decisions, and undoubtedly one of its 
causes, is what can only be characterized as a general unwillingness among 
state supreme courts to engage in any kind of analysis of the state constitution 
at all.”27 In fact, Professor Gardner, after surveying states, proclaimed “that 
state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and 
essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”28 
Turning to state constitutions to protect rights means accepting inherently 
limited success across the country. These successes in the face of failures in the 
Supreme Court are surely better than nothing, but it would be a mistake to 
pretend that it is more than a distant second best. Some states found rights to 
educational equality in their state constitutions, but it would have been so much 
better if the Supreme Court had done it nationally in San Antonio Board of 
Education v. Rodriguez so that every state would have had this result.29  
Third, using state constitutions to advance rights has far greater costs for 
litigants than using the federal constitution. Again, the example of the 
educational equity litigation is revealing. If the Court in Rodriguez would have 
found that inequalities in school spending violated the United States 
Constitution, there would have been no need to litigate this issue state by state 
under state constitutions. One decision by the United States Supreme Court 
finding a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians would obviate the 
 
on Justices in Anti-Bird Effort, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 1. 
25. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring unconstitutional segregation of public schools 
based on race). 
26. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (describing the federal judges 
who implemented desegregation in the south). 
27. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 761, 781 (1992). 
28. Id. at 763. 
29. 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school funding do not violate 
equal protection). 
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need to litigate this state by state, with all of the costs inherent to such 
litigation. 
Obviously, the extent of the costs will vary by issue. In the area of 
educational equity, it is reasonable to assume that even if Rodriguez had come 
out the other way, there still would have had to be litigation in individual states 
to implement it. Some issues, and marriage equality may be one of them, tend 
to be more a matter of law than fact and thus the costs of litigation are reduced. 
In some areas, it may be that even proceeding under the United States 
Constitution will require that test cases be brought in several different places 
around the country simultaneously, as was done in the school desegregation 
litigation which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education.30  
All of this is right, but it still is undoubtedly true that litigating under state 
constitutions requires separate suits in each state and that is a far more 
expensive strategy than succeeding under the United States Constitution. In a 
world of inherently limited resources, especially for litigation to advance rights 
and equalities, this often is a significant impediment to success. 
Fourth, successes via state constitutional law often can be undone via the 
initiative process. In most states, it is easier to amend the state constitution as 
compared to the United States Constitution.31 Many states allow their state 
constitutions to be amended through the initiative process. Thus, state court 
decisions interpreting the state constitution to advance liberty or equality can be 
undone through the electoral process. The most obvious example of this is how 
the California Supreme Court’s decision creating a right to marriage equality 
for gays and lesbians was overturned within six months by Proposition 8.32 The 
same, of course, occurred in Hawaii as the voters amended the state’s 
constitution after the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the state’s law 
prohibiting same-sex marriage had to meet strict scrutiny.33 
The initiative process also can be used to block state courts from being able 
to use state constitutions to advance liberty and equality. Voters in many states 
passed initiatives banning same sex marriages before their state courts could 
even consider this.34 In a number of states, voters have passed initiatives to ban 
affirmative action by state and local governments.35 In some states, initiatives 
passed to ban busing for school desegregation or to eliminate open housing 
laws.36 
 
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
31. See THOMAS C. MARKS & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306-09 
(2d ed. 2003); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 359 
(2009). 
32. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding Proposition 8 as a valid 
amendment to the state constitution). 
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
34. These are summarized supra note 9. 
35. Proposition 209 in California and Proposition 2 in Michigan are examples of this. 
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating 
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All of this points to a serious limit on reliance on state constitutions. State 
constitutions are generally more majoritarian than the United States 
Constitution because they are easier for the majority to change, such as through 
the initiative process. Advancing individual liberties and furthering equality is 
thus inherently more problematic under state constitutions because it puts the 
rights of the minority more in the hands of the majority. 
Fifth, there are costs and difficulties to having differences across the 
country in many areas of individual rights. Protecting rights through state 
constitutions rather than the United States Constitution thus can create 
significant problems. For example, if some states, but not others, recognize 
same-sex marriages there are countless problems. Will states that do not allow 
same-sex marriages have to recognize them from states that do? What about 
child custody decrees or rules about probating estates: how will these be 
handled? 
I am not arguing that these difficulties are reasons not to use state 
constitutions. As someone who believes in marriage equality, I would rather 
see it in a few states with these difficulties than see it nowhere and not have the 
system face these problems. But it must be recognized that there are costs to 
using state constitutions that are avoided if a national right is recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
There are many responses to all of this. One powerful answer is that I 
misunderstand the value of state constitutionalism; that its virtue is procedural 
in that there is benefit to having states with their own robust constitutional 
traditions. From this perspective, it is no criticism of state constitutional law if 
it fails to find a right to marriage equality across the country. The criticism of 
my argument is that I am assessing state constitutions in terms of their ability to 
achieve particular results which I am assuming to be desirable and not 
recognizing the benefits of state constitutionalism from a federalism 
perspective. 
But this criticism depends entirely on why people turn to state 
constitutionalism. William Brennan’s seminal article on state constitutionalism 
looked to it as a way of advancing liberties and equality at a time of 
retrenchment by the United States Supreme Court. This focus on state 
constitutions has intensified after the state court decisions in Massachusetts, 
California, and Iowa finding a right to same-sex marriage. It is this aspect of 
state constitutionalism to which I am responding: the hope for state 
constitutions replacing the United States Constitution as a way of increasing the 
protection for rights. It is this purpose that I am saying will never be achieved 
as well at the state level as through the United States Constitution. I am not 
opposed to states having robust constitutional law and will concede that there 
are inherent benefits to this in terms of federalism. But it is when state 
 
a Washington initiative prohibiting busing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) 
(invalidating a state initiative repealing open housing laws). 
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constitutions are looked to as a substitute for protecting rights under the United 
States Constitution that I am skeptical of the possibility for success. 
Another related criticism of what I have argued is that it ignores other 
benefits of state constitutionalism. For example, state constitutions can be the 
laboratories for experimentation that federalism often promises.37 There are 
many examples where state courts interpreting state constitutions preceded and 
arguably led to the greater recognition of rights under the United States 
Constitution. The California Supreme Court found that a prohibition on 
interracial marriage violated its state constitution more than twenty years before 
the United States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia and found that 
anti-miscegenation laws deny equal protection.38 
The reasoning of the state courts can influence subsequent decisions by the 
Supreme Court. The experience of the states also can do this. Advocates of 
marriage equality have reason to hope that as the country, including the justices 
on the United States Supreme Court, see the experience in states like 
Massachusetts and Iowa, they will see that there are no ills associated with 
same-sex marriage. 
I wholeheartedly agree with this argument, which is one of the reasons why 
I strongly support using state constitutions and state courts when success at the 
federal level is unlikely. Advocates of marriage equality surely made the right 
choice in starting in state courts because it was too unlikely that they could win 
in the United States Supreme Court at that stage and state victories could pave 
the way for someday winning in the high court. But none of this is inconsistent 
with my central point—that state constitutionalism is a second-best alternative 
for advancing liberty and equality. 
II. SHOULD PROPOSITION 8 BE CHALLENGED AS VIOLATING THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURT? 
The choice by high profile lawyers David Boies and Ted Olsen to bring a 
suit in federal court challenging Proposition 8 as violating the United States 
Constitution caused consternation among gay and lesbian rights advocates who 
had carefully structured their litigation to avoid such arguments.39 The 
marriage equality litigation was brought in state courts based entirely on state 
constitutions to keep the matter from being removed to federal court or ever 
getting to the United States Supreme Court. In conversations with some of the 
lawyers who litigated marriage equality cases in the states, they expressed to 
 
37. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”). 
38. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating California ban on 
interracial marriages); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
39. See Maura Dolan, Prop 8 Foes Clash Over Federal Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, 
at A35. 
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me great reservations about going to the Supreme Court too early and thus 
risking a devastating loss. Their sense is that it would be more likely to win in 
the Supreme Court after a series of wins in states and the Justices would have 
had the chance to see that marriage equality has worked well. 
I understand this argument and have great respect for the lawyers who 
make it. But I think that going to federal court makes sense under the current 
circumstances. For the reasons explained above, significant additional success 
under state constitutions is unlikely. Indeed, the arguments made above in Part 
I help to explain why it was desirable to have a federal constitutional challenge 
to Proposition 8 brought in federal district court. Most states now have state 
constitutional provisions which define marriage as being between a man and a 
woman and few remaining state supreme courts can or will find a right to 
marriage equality. Litigating state-by-state in addition to being unlikely to 
succeed is far more expensive than success in one case that will affect the entire 
country. In this way, the challenge to Proposition 8 now pending in federal 
court really is a case study of the limits of state constitutional litigation 
discussed in Part I.  
Ultimately, the choice whether to go to federal court is a gamble about 
Justice Anthony Kennedy. The conventional wisdom, which I share and discuss 
more fully below, is that it is likely to be a five-to-four decision in the United 
States Supreme Court with Justice Kennedy being the swing Justice in the 
majority. 
I agree with Boies and Olsen that there is good reason to believe that 
Justice Kennedy would be a fifth vote to strike down bans on marriage equality. 
In all of American history, there have been two Supreme Court decisions 
protecting gays and lesbians; Anthony Kennedy was the author of both of 
these. In Romer v. Evans, the Court, in a six-to-three decision, struck down a 
Colorado initiative that repealed all laws in the state protecting gays and 
lesbians from discrimination and precluded the enactment of any new such 
laws.40 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority found that the Colorado 
initiative failed even rational basis review for failing to serve a legitimate 
purpose. Justice Kennedy wrote:  
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once 
too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies 
them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of 
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is 
unprecedented in our jurisprudence.41  
The Court was explicit that it could identify nothing behind the initiative except 
animus for gays and lesbians. Justice Kennedy stated:  
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons 
 
40. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
41. Id. at 633. 
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affected. . . . Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that 
gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, 
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie 
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.42  
He concluded his majority opinion by declaring: “We must conclude that 
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but 
to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”43 
The other case protecting gays and lesbians, of course, was Lawrence v. 
Texas.44 In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the right 
to privacy does not include a right of adults to engage in private consensual 
homosexual activity.45 In Lawrence, the Court expressly overruled Bowers. 
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-person majority, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.46 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion declared: 
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It 
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now 
is overruled.”47 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that the Texas law 
prohibiting homosexual activity served no legitimate government purpose:  
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot 
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter.’ The Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.48 
Admittedly, Justice Kennedy made clear that the Court was not dealing 
with the issue of marriage equality. He said that the case “does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”49 Nor did the Court use heightened 
scrutiny; the Court did not expressly say the level of scrutiny that is being 
applied, but instead concluded that the Texas law would fail even rational basis 
review because it served no legitimate purpose. 
 
42. Id. at 634-35. 
43. Id. at 635. 
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
45. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
46. Justice O’Connor, the sixth justice in the majority in Romer, concurred in the 
Lawrence judgment. She would not have overruled Bowers, but instead would have found 
that the Texas law was unconstitutional because it applied only to same-sex sexual activity 
and prohibited sex acts between same-sex couples that were allowed between opposite-sex 
couples. The Georgia law, in Bowers, prohibited oral-genital and anal-genital contacts both 
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
47. Lawerence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion). 
48. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
49. Id. 
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These opinions by Justice Kennedy provide a good basis for believing that 
he will be a fifth vote for a constitutional right to marriage equality. In both 
Romer and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions emphasized the 
lack of a legitimate purpose behind the laws in question. Quite similarly, it is 
difficult to identify any legitimate purpose served by keeping gays and lesbians 
from expressing love and commitment through marriage and receiving all of 
the benefits the law long has provided heterosexual couples who choose to 
marry.50  
I have participated in countless debates over marriage equality, including 
in the campaign over Proposition 8. I am always struck by the absence of any 
identifiable legitimate interest for the ban on same-sex marriage. What are the 
arguments likely to be advanced before the Supreme Court to justify the denial 
of marriage equality?  
One argument is that marriage is inherently between opposite-sex couples. 
But this is a definition, not an argument. The fact that marriage has traditionally 
been between opposite-sex couples doesn’t reveal anything about the 
characteristics of marriage and why those characteristics have to be limited to 
opposite-sex couples. Under this form of argument, then laws that prohibited 
interracial marriage were also constitutional. The Virginia law that prohibited 
interracial marriage existed for almost three hundred years.51 If a long tradition 
of prohibiting types of marriage is sufficient, then the Court came to the wrong 
conclusion in Loving v. Virginia.52 Certainly, the existence of a practice over a 
long period of time doesn’t tell us anything about whether that practice is 
legitimate or permissible. Admittedly, Loving used strict scrutiny and it is 
uncertain whether the Supreme Court would do so either under due process or 
equal protection in examining the ban on marriage equality for gays and 
lesbians. But if one thinks about all of the core characteristics of marriage, the 
expression of love and commitment, the benefits and responsibilities, none of 
these have anything to do with the sexual orientation of the individuals 
participating. 
A second argument that is likely to be advanced in the Court is that 
marriage is inherently about procreation. Therefore, same-sex marriage doesn’t 
make sense because same-sex couples can’t procreate without assistance. But 
this argument is wrong on every possible level. Marriage, of course, isn’t 
inherently about procreation. Couples are allowed to get marriage licenses, 
even if one or both of them can’t or doesn’t want any children. Women past the 
age of menopause can get marriage licenses, as can men who have been 
 
50. Of course, advocates of marriage equality argue that strict scrutiny is appropriate 
because a fundamental right, the right to marry, is at issue, and because sexual orientation 
discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny. Obviously, if the Court were to use strict 
scrutiny, then the bans on same-sex marriage would be unlikely to survive. 
51. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND 
ROMANCE 19 (2001). 
52. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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sterilized or are infertile. A requirement of intent to procreate does not exist for 
heterosexual couples who want a marriage license, so there’s no sense to 
impose it for same-sex couples. More importantly, same-sex couples do 
procreate, whether it’s through artificial insemination or surrogacy or adoption. 
Even if marriage is about procreation, there is no legitimate reason to deny this 
to same-sex couples because they have children too.  
A third argument that’s made is that children do better when they have 
opposite-sex parents than same-sex parents and thus the government is justified 
in denying marriage licenses for same-sex couples. No less than President 
George W. Bush made this argument.53 He said the social science data shows 
that children do better if they have parents of opposite gender.54 At the outset, 
it is important to note that is not what the studies say; the studies that are 
pointed to are ones that talk about children with single parents often having 
more problems than children with two parents.55 But that has nothing do to 
with sexual orientation. It does reflect that being a parent is enormously 
difficult and, as somebody who has always been lucky enough to have a partner 
in parenting, I can only imagine how difficult it is to be a single parent of a 
child. But that doesn’t at all relate to the issue of whether or not same-sex 
couples should get marriage licenses.  
But most of all, the problem with this argument is that it truly misses the 
point. The question is not whether same-sex couples should have children or 
not. The reality is that same-sex couples are going to have children. The 
question becomes whether children of same-sex couples are better off if their 
parents are married or unmarried. I know of no studies that have been done that 
compare children with same-sex parents who are married to children of 
same-sex parents who are unmarried. Same-sex marriage is so new, not only in 
the United States but around the world, that time is needed to do such studies. 
Everything that we understand about marriage and how it contributes to the 
stability of relationships would indicate that children with same-sex parents are 
better off if those parents are married than unmarried because marriage is more 
likely to lead to stable relationships.  
The point isn’t: would children do better with parents of opposite gender or 
same gender. The point is: given that there are children in same-sex couples, 
are they better off with their parents being married or unmarried? As Chief 
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals declared:  
 The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children, but 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no way furthers this interest. In 
fact, it undermines it. Civil marriage provides tangible legal protections and 
economic benefits to married couples and their children, and tens of thousands 
of children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New York. . . . 
 
53. See Benedict Carey, Experts Dispute Bush on Gay-Adoption Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2005, at A16. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
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The State’s interest in a stable society is rationally advanced when families are 
established and remain intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.56 
A fourth argument that is often made against same-sex marriage is that it 
will harm the institution of marriage. I confess that I don’t understand the 
argument. No heterosexual couple’s marriage is adversely affected in the 
slightest by virtue of gays and lesbians also being able to marry. In fact, I 
cannot think of anything that has been more affirming of the institution of 
marriage in my lifetime than the fight by gays and lesbians to be able to marry.  
A related argument sometimes advanced is that there is a slippery slope, 
that recognizing a constitutional right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians 
will prevent states from imposing any limits on marriage and force states to 
recognize marital arrangements such as polygamy. The crucial question would 
be whether states can show that there is a sufficiently important government 
interest to justify the ban on polygamy. No such interest exists with regard to 
marriage between gays and lesbians. Whether such an interest exists with 
regard to polygamy would need to be litigated. Traditionally, the arguments 
against polygamy are based on the subordination of women historically 
attendant to it and the benefit for children in monogamous marriages. If these 
can be shown, then the ban on polygamy could be upheld even after the ban on 
same-sex marriages was deemed to violate the United States Constitution.  
The lack of a plausible legitimate argument against marriage equality for 
gays and lesbians leads to the same conclusion that Justice Kennedy came to in 
Romer: the laws are really based on animus towards gays and lesbians and the 
type of moral disapproval of homosexual activity that the Court rejected in 
Lawrence. It is what convinces me not only that Justice Kennedy is likely to 
vote to strike down Proposition 8, but also that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor (or replacements for them picked by President Obama) 
will do so. 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision banning the 
televising of the trial over Proposition 8 in January 2010 gives some pause 
because Justice Kennedy joined with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito, sure opponents of a right to marriage equality.57 This vote 
led some to see the ruling as a harbinger of Justice Kennedy siding with the 
conservatives on the issue of marriage equality and saying that it was a mistake 
to take the matter to federal court.58 This is certainly possible, though it is also 
possible that his vote reflects his views about cameras in the courtroom more 
than about the underlying merits of the issue. There will be no way to know, 
though, until the Court takes and decides the case on the constitutionality of 
Proposition 8. 
 
56. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
57. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010). 
58. David G. Savage, Prop. 8 Ruling Seen as an Omen, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at 
A1. 
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My central point is that I think in light of the limits of state 
constitutionalism, Justice Kennedy’s prior opinions, and the underlying merits, 
it was a sensible decision to bring a challenge to Proposition 8 in federal court 
based on the United States Constitution. The timing also makes sense because 
the Supreme Court is not likely to be more hospitable to such a suit for at least 
a decade. None of the other conservatives are likely to leave the high court 
before then; John Roberts is fifty-five in 2010, Samuel Alito is sixty in 2010, 
Clarence Thomas will be sixty-two, Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy will 
turn seventy-four. There is every reason to believe that they could still be on 
the bench in 2017 even if there are two Obama terms. Rather than litigate under 
state constitutions for another decade, Boies and Olsen made a good gamble in 
light of the limits on state constitutionalism that they can win in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the years, I have been invited to participate in many conferences on 
state constitutional law and always have declined. I am not a critic of relying on 
state constitutions to advance liberties and equality. I hope that in countless 
areas state supreme courts will use their constitutions to achieve what cannot be 
done under the United States Constitution because of the conservative Supreme 
Court. 
But I also always have thought of state constitutional law as a second best 
way to accomplish desirable results. In this article, I have tried to explain why 
and thus why turning to the United States Constitution to challenge Proposition 
8 made a great deal of sense. 
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